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1. Introduction 
In uttering a sentence we are often taken to assert more than its literal meaning — though 
we sometimes assert less. For example, when some says ‘I haven’t eaten’ it is seldom, if 
ever, taken to express the improbable claim that the speaker has never ingested food. 
Robyn Carston and others take this phenomenon to show that what is said or asserted by 
a speaker on an occasion is usually a contextually-enriched version of the semantic 
content of the sentence uttered. I shall argue that we can resist this conclusion if we 
recognize that what we think we are asserting, or take others to be asserting, involves 
selective attention to one of the ways the sentence could be true while neglecting others. 
Most of the time people converge in their selective attention and so communication is not 
impaired; though in the case of sentences involving predicates of taste people’s selective 
attention to different aspect of the truth conditions of the sentence can lead to seemingly 
intractable disputes. I will propose a treatment of such cases on which speakers can mean 
the same thing by a sentence, assert no more than its semantic content, and yet hold 
conflicting opinions about its truth-value and both be right. 
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2. Semantics and Pragmatics 
In ‘Linguistic Meaning, Communicated Meaning and Cognitive Pragmatics’ (2002), 
Robyn Carston distinguishes between a philosophical and a cognitive science perspective 
on linguistic communication. Philosophers of language mostly concentrate on semantic 
issues and regard pragmatics as concerned with the problems left over by semantics. 
Cognitive scientists, on the other hand, see pragmatics as concerned with the mental 
processes that yield interpretations of people’s utterances in a context. The two 
approaches seem to pass each other by, with philosophers of language concentrating on 
the semantic properties of expression types, and cognitive scientists concentrating on how 
speakers and listeners communicate through utterances. However, this division of labour 
understates the potential consequences cognitive pragmatics has for philosophy of 
language. For if pragmatic processes must be invoked in order to fix something 
propositional — the explicitly communicated proposition — then the standard view of 
semantics as accounting for the way declarative sentences express propositions falls by 
the wayside.  
 
Recently, philosophers of language have begun to see the potential impact on their 
subject of accepting the conclusions of cognitive pragmatics and have started fighting a 
rearguard action (see, in particular, Cappelen and Lepore 2005). Such defenses often 
trade on the distinction Carston draws between semantic theories being about what words 
and sentences mean, and theories in pragmatics being about what speakers mean and how 
they communicate. Philosophers of language try to rescue the mission of semantics by 
making it either the study of minimal propositions (whatever they are)1 literally expressed 
by sentences, or the sub-propositional contents sentences express2; neither of which look 
very much like the contents the folk consider to be the literal meaning of their sentences. 
In response, advocates of cognitive pragmatics suggest that what we mean in using a 
sentence is almost never what the sentence means; instead we rely on a great deal of non-
linguistic inference to figure out what is said when a sentence is uttered in a given 
context. However, the ordinary speaker’s intuition is that what someone says in uttering a 
                                                
1 See Cappelen and Lepore’s notion of a minimal proposition in their 2005. 
2 See Kent Bach’s notion of a propositional radical in Bach 1994 and 2001. 
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sentence is closely tied to the words they used to say it. ‘I took him at his word’, we say, 
and, ‘He may have meant something else but this is what he said’. I think there’s 
something right about the ordinary speaker’s intuition but in order to respect that intuition 
one must reject the view that the literal meaning of an uttered sentence is either the 
proposition the semantic minimalist points to, or the incomplete proposition solely 
determined by the meaning of the sentence’s syntactic constituents and the way they are 
put together. A more sympathetic construal of the (naïve) intuition — that what you said 
is tied to the words you used to say it— requires a re-working of the of the notion of 
literal meaning in order to connect it more closely with the thought typically, or most 
often, communicated by use of a sentence. Nevertheless, a distinction exists between 
what we take ourselves to be saying in our use of words, and what we actually say by 
means of them. And neither the philosopher of language nor the cognitive scientist on 
Carston’s picture has the relation between these two things exactly right.  
 
The problem is the use made of the notion of proposition and truth condition in both 
semantic and pragmatic theorizing. The notion of proposition and truth condition are 
assumed to go together, on the one side, but to diverge from what is explicitly expressed 
by a sentence, on the other. I shall reject this assumption by offering an account involving 
what we say, what we think we say, and what we communicate. But before doing so, I 
want to examine the cognitive pragmatic view of the distance between the literal meaning 
of expressions and what is explicitly communicated by utterance of them. 
 
 
3. The Context Sensitivity of ‘What is Said’ 
The key claim about context sensitivity is that a sentence uttered, in different contexts of 
use, or by different people in the same context, can be understood differently, even 
though the sentence itself is not lexically or syntactically ambiguous. Examples include 
utterances of: 
 
(1) The leaves are green 
(2) John’s car is red 
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(3) It is raining 
(4) The wine is beautifully balanced 
 
In each of these cases a speaker may mean something different by his or her utterance of 
the sentence in different contexts, and different speakers may mean different things by 
utterance of the same sentence in the same contexts. In (2) speakers may be talking about 
the car owned by John, stolen by John, or the car John bet on. In (3) what is said depends 
on the time and place of the utterance. What should we conclude from such cases?  They 
clearly point to context-sensitivity in the use and understanding of the sentences 
concerned. But what, if anything should we conclude about the semantic content of the 
sentences themselves? The temptation has been to think that variability in how utterances 
of these sentences are understood across contexts means variability in what those 
sentences express in those contexts. But the conclusion is hasty. A more guarded claim is 
that when a sentence is uttered in different contexts, different utterance contents, or 
speech act contents are expressed, despite the sentence’s having the same semantic 
content on each occasion. As it is often put, the utterance or speech act content goes 
beyond the semantic content of the sentence uttered.  
 
What then explains the variability in utterance or speech act content? Relevance theorists 
like Carston assume that since the semantic content of a sentence typically fails, by itself, 
to determine the thought-content communicated by an utterance of the sentence, as in (2), 
and that cognitive processes are needed to get at the thought-content conveyed. In fact, 
pragmatic processes are always involved in the interpretation of speech, according to 
Carston, since the sentence uttered (almost) always underdetermines the content 
communicated by speaker to hearer. As she puts it: 
 
The semantics of the linguistic expression type employed in an utterance, while 
clearly crucial to comprehension, is seen as having just an evidential role, rather 
than a fully determining, role in the identification of what a speaker has explicitly 
communicated (‘what is said’) (Carston, 2002 p.130) 
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The pragmatic processes work to make up the shortfall between what is made available to 
the listener by the linguistically encoded content of the uttered sentence, and the thought 
content conveyed to the listener by its utterance: 
 
The linguistically encoded element of an utterance is not generally geared towards 
achieving as high a degree of explicitness as possible, but rather more towards 
keeping processing effort down (ibid. p.130) 
 
I agree. But what should we conclude? Do speakers intend to convey more than their 
words alone succeed in expressing? Carston certainly thinks so: 
 
…the linguistic contribution [of the uttered sentence] is not propositional, it is not 
a complete semantic entity, not truth-evaluable (ibid. p.134)  
 
The linguistic material produced fails to fix a truth-evaluable content,3 nevertheless a 
propositional thought is communicated, so it is the task of cognitive pragmatics to say 
how this achieved.  
 
There are a several things to note about Carston’s view. First, it assumes that what gets 
communicated or conveyed is a truth-evaluable propositon: 
 
…what is communicated, that is the output of the pragmatic processor, is usually 
a set of fully propositional thoughts or assumptions, which are either true or false 
of an external state of affairs in the world. (ibid., p.134) 
 
There may be more than one proposition recovered in cases where there are explicitly 
and implicitly communicated propositions. But I shall concentrate on the explicitly 
communicated propositions since these are, ‘in some sense, built out of [upon] the 
semantic template contributed by the linguistic expression used’ (ibid., p.134)  
                                                
3 I won’t discuss those who, like John MacFarlane, assume propositions can lack truth 
values but still be true or false relative to contexts of assessment. See MacFarlane’s 2007. 
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Second, the picture assumes that the proposition communicated is seldom, if ever, 
entirely fixed by the linguistic meaning of the sentence uttered: 
 
…linguistically decoded information is usually very incomplete and…pragmatic 
inference plays an essential role in the derivation of the proposition explicitly 
communicated. (ibid., p.133) 
 
Not only is it the case that the sentence uttered fails to provide evidence of precisely 
which proposition the speaker intends to convey, it supposedly fails to express a 
proposition at all. (On this point Carston and radical minimalists like Kent Bach agree). A 
successful linguistic act results in the recovery by a hearer of a proposition conveyed by a 
speaker. So pragmatics needs to explain the means by which the hearer derives the 
proposition explicitly communicated.  
 
This programme has potentially worrying consequences for the semanticist because if it 
is propositions that have truth conditions, and pragmatic processes are needed to arrive at 
propositions, then pragmatic processes will be required to derive anything truth 
conditional. Hence, for anyone who thinks truth conditions belong in the domain of 
semantics, there would appear to be no clear boundary between semantics and 
pragmatics; no boundary between what is fixed by the semantic properties of expressions 
and what is fixed by the cognitive processing of those expressions in context. To 
maintain a firm boundary between semantics and pragmatics one would have to show 
how an uttered sentence could so much as express a proposition, or else settle for the 
conclusion that sentences expressed only incomplete propositional functions from which 
hearers somehow figured out the proposition the speaker intended to communicate.  
 
H.P. Grice, of course, had a different story about how we get from the proposition 
expressed by an uttered sentence (‘what is said’) to a (further) proposition conveyed by 
its utterance (‘what is meant’). But Grice was over-sanguine about being able to find a 
single or complete proposition determined by the semantic constituents of the sentence 
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and the way they are syntactically put together. That’s why semantic minimalists work so 
hard to do to show that the constituents and structure of sentences do determine truth-
evaluable propositions.  
 
Contextualists and relevance theorists, if they are prepared to acknowledge the existence 
of such theoretically-motivated minimal propositions, can argue that they play no role in 
the processes by which a hearer arrives at the proposition communicated by a speaker. 
Pragmatics begins with processes that adjust the meanings of expressions used, and 
enrich the sentence structure in the light of certain features of the context to reach 
relevant interpretations of utterances in context. No use is made at any stage of the literal 
meaning of the sentence-type.4 Radical minimalists, like Bach, do take sentence 
meanings to make a contribution to interpretation but these incomplete propositions must 
be augmented by the hearer to reach the communicated content of the utterance. 
 
 
4. Maintaining Semantics 
So we appear to face the following options. Either the pragmatic processing of utterances, 
rather than the literal meaning of sentences, enables speakers to grasp the thoughts (truth-
evaluable propositions) they convey; or, the literal semantic content of a sentence is a 
minimal proposition that plays no role in the interpretation of the utterance, but may be 
asserted alongside the propositional content(s) explicitly communicated and 
pragmatically retrieved by the hearer; or, uttered sentences express something less than a 
proposition.  
 
All of these options assume that speakers assert more than, or diverging from, the literal 
meaning of the sentences they utter. Contextualists and relevance theorists claim that 
what is said or asserted by a speaker on an occasion is a contextually-enriched or modified 
version of the semantic contents of the expressions used. Semantic minimalists concede 
                                                
4 Examples like ‘I haven’t had breakfast’ ‘Don’t eat between meals’  are almost never 
recognised as expressing what they literally state, but are usually interpreted as 
augmented or modified as follows: ‘I haven’t had breakfast [this morning]’, ‘Don’t eat 
between {each meal you normally eat}’.  
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that what is said or asserted is not the proposition understood in context (and may not 
even be a proposition). For the philosopher of language, the crucial assumption behind 
these approaches is that we need something more than the meaningful and grammatically 
arranged constituents of a sentence to arrive at the truth conditional content of its 
utterance: the proposition communicated.5 The search for the truth-evaluable 
propositional content conveyed drives contextualists and relevance theorists to depart 
from the literal meaning of the sentence uttered, and drives semantic minimalists to 
embrace a linguistically determined but dismally thin proposition bearing no resemblance 
to the contents speakers and hearers recognize as being in play in their exchanges.  
 
But need we accept any of these views? No. There is another option overlooked by all 
parties to the debate: namely, that given what a sentence means there is more than one 
way for it to be true; and in context, users of a sentence usually entertain only one of 
these ways for it to be true. When we regularly take a particular sentence to be claiming 
only one of the things it could be taken to be claiming given what it means, this amounts 
to its intuitively understood literal meaning. Of course, a less intuitive, and highly 
theoretical notion of what is literally expressed can be constructed to bring out aspects of 
a sentence’s meaning that were previously unnoticed. It is these other, unusual, ways of 
taking a sentence to be true that lead some to suppose that the same sentence can express 
different propositions in different contexts. However, all a sentence’s meaning does is 
constrain the way things have to be in the world in order for that sentence to be true, and 
this will encompass more ways of being true than we usually consider. When thinking of 
what a sentence says we selectively attend to just one of the ways in which the sentence 
could be true. Take (1) for example: 
 
(1) The leaves are green 
 
                                                
5 Even less than the utterance of a sentence will do if Stainton is right and non-sentential 
utterances, like ‘Nice dress’ can also convey propositional contents. See Stainton 2005, 
2006. 
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Most people on hearing an utterance of (1) while contemplating a tree in a garden would 
suppose the leaves to be naturally green. That’s the natural thing to think given our usual 
understanding of (1). However, Charles Travis exploits this example by citing cases 
where Pia has painted the russet leaves on her tree green. Is (1) true here? Travis 
concludes that since the first way of taking the sentence to be true is not the same as the 
second, (1) expresses (means) different things on different occasions; that (1) can be used 
to assert different truths. Sometimes what it says would be true, sometimes it would be 
false. Travis concludes that sentences have at most occasion-sensitive meanings, and only 
in context can they express something capable of being true or false.6  
 
But that’s not the only way to react to such examples. We could say that the sentence is 
true under both conditions since, for all it says, it simply has to be that the leaves are 
green for it to be true. Both count as ways of making (1) true, even though the second 
way to take (1) is highly unnatural. The meaning of the sentence places no qualification 
on the way in which the leaves are green. The natural way for leaves to be green is just 
one way of fitting what the sentence says. In using (1) we express something about reality 
that could be realized in many more ways than we at first recognize. Despite that we 
often manage to get across something more specific than is actually said. Our use of 
language is not as precise or explicit as we think. Nonetheless, we succeed in 
communicating with others because they, like us, selectively attend to the most usual or 
natural way of taking what is expressed to be true: they focus on the same salient 
circumstances.  
 
We are surprised to discover there are other ways for reality to fit what a sentence says. 
As ordinary speakers, we consider the intuitive way of understanding it as its literal 
meaning. The more precise and demanding notion of literal meaning is typically 
overlooked by all save Asperger’s syndrome subjects for whom the non-obvious 
situations may be more accessible.7 We take (1) to express the claim that the leaves are 
                                                
6 See Travis 1997. 
7 Reported cases include a child who became distressed when told by the teacher: ‘Stick 
your coat over there’ because he could find no glue. (see Frith and Happé 1996) 
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naturally green. This is what we think makes (1) true. But this is not to say, with Travis, 
that in one context (1) would be true, and in another, it would be false. Of course, it is 
misleading to say (1) when the leaves have been painted green, given what we ordinarily 
think (1) says, but given what it actually says, the unusual situation is still a way of 
making it true. There is more than one way for reality to conform to what a sentence says.  
 
We can now see that part of the trouble is due to the conception of literal meaning, truth 
condition and proposition in semantic and pragmatic theorizing. The intuitive notion of 
what speakers literally mean by their utterances coincides with what they intuitively take 
their sentences to mean, where this is just one way of taking those sentence to be true. In 
pragmatic theories, truth conditions enter only at the level of utterance interpretation 
coinciding with the explicitly communicated proposition retrieved by pragmatic 
processing. But that’s a mistake. The sentence uttered was true (or false) all along, even 
be true under conditions that may surprise us. The sentence’s truth conditions cover 
circumstances not even considered by speakers and hearers who use the sentence. When 
we do come to appreciate that a sentence could be true in circumstances previously 
unconsidered, we recognize those circumstances to be compatible with what the sentence 
says. Thus it is a mistake to suppose that truth conditions only appear with the 
proposition normally communicated. True, the natural way of take a sentence to be true 
pairs with our intuitive understanding of what is said in uttering the sentence, and this 
conicides with certain pragmatic interpretations. However, when we come to see what 
else could make the sentence true, consistent with what it means, we recognize something 
that our understanding already allowed for. The sentence’s wider application gives us its 
explicit meaning. This is not a new meaning we confer on it to extend its application. 
What is explicitly expressed by a sentence is fixed by the syntactic arrangement of its 
meaningful constituents, and this coincides with its broad truth conditions but diverges 
from its intuitive meaning: the proposition speakers communicate.  A sentence’s truth 
conditions cannot be construed as narrowly as the unique set of circumstances typically 
considered when producing or comprehending the sentence. To construe truth conditions 
this narrowly — in line with the proposition communicated — leads to trouble, since 
these are not uniquely fixed by the spoken sentence’s meaning. When we realize that a 
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sentence could be true under unforeseen circumstances, we realize that those 
circumstances were always covered by the meaning of the sentence, that they were 
always encompassed by its truth conditions.  
 
5. Truth Conditions, Selective Attention, and Proposition Communicated 
In cognitive pragmatics, the notions of truth condition and proposition communicated are 
aligned, forcing us to divorce them from what is strictly expressed by the sentence 
uttered. The ordinary notion of what (1) literally says does coincide with the proposition 
we typically communicate by uttering it. But in failing to anticipate all the ways (1) could 
be true in the world, ordinary understanding diverges from the actual truth conditions of 
the sentence. One could institute a special notion of intuitive truth conditions for a 
sentence, aligned with the notion of proposition communicated, but that would not be the 
only relevant notion of truth for the sentence, or the only thing we could recognize as 
compatible with its meaning. Many states of affairs could conform to what the sentence 
says, though we may only think of some of them. But since we could be brought to see 
that the meaning of the sentence uttered did not rule out or limit us to just one particular 
way the world had to be to make the sentence true, we must recognize more to a 
sentence’s meaning and truth conditions than cognitive pragmatics allows. The ‘more’ 
here can be brought to light by contemplating unusual circumstances, which help us 
recognize the compatibility of what we said with more states of affairs than we first 
realized. For example, beside the alarm button in the lifts at Stockholm University it is 
written: ‘Press the alarm button if the lift stops between two floors.’ Most people take this 
to mean that we should press the button if the lift stops between two adjacent floors. 
However, for all it says, when we travel from floor five to seven, we could comply with 
the instruction by pressing the button when the lift stops at floor six.8 Even if we don’t 
use sentences in accordance with their full range of linguistically permissible 
applications, we can confirm their other rather surprising applications just by reflecting 
on the meaning we attach to these sentences. Language can surprise us. This doesn’t 
mean that communication is bound to fail, or that on every occasion elaborate pragmatic 
inferences are to figure out what people are saying. Not all options are live, and, so long 
                                                
8 I owe this nice example to Peter Pagin. 
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as others focus on the same condition that making a sentence true as we do, things go 
well. Special contexts may call for special inferences but given our selective attention, 
shared needs, perceptions and interests, special inferences are not always operative, or 
needed in the normal case. Hearing a sentence one way rather than another — focusing 
on a restricted way the world could be to make that sentence is true — helps to explain 
why we do not usually find ourselves at odds in understanding one another. No appeal to 
unconscious computations of others’ intentions is needed each time to explain the 
immediate and effortless way we arrive at an intuitive understanding of what is said. 9 
 
6. Thoughts and Utterances 
Carston (2002) is right to consider our use of language to concern the relation between 
thoughts and utterances but in stressing the role contextual inference plays in arriving at 
the thoughts conveyed she downplays the everyday aspects of linguistic sentence 
meaning of sentences and the role it plays in securing regular communication of our 
thoughts to one another. By focusing on the strict and hard to access notion of what is 
literally expressed, which diverges from our ordinary understanding of sentences, she is 
able to secure a premise for an argument designed to show that truth and truth conditions 
enter only at the level of the pragmatically derived proposition communicated. 
  
But the intuitive notion of what is literally said focuses on the restricted application we 
make of sentences on a selective understanding of their truth conditions. We cannot make 
every bit of our thinking explicit, but we do say enough to direct one another’s thinking, 
in context, to what we are talking about, provided we remain (unlike Asperger’s subjects) 
unaware of the rather surprising things our utterance could be taken to mean. There is 
considerable slack between thought and language. Focused thoughts are not uniquely 
captured in the words chosen to express them, though speakers are largely unaware of 
this fact. The meaning of the sentence constrains the ways the world has to be in order for 
what we say in uttering it to be true but does not select one definite way of its being true. 
However, our perceiving or thinking — and other people’s perceiving and thinking — 
                                                
9 For an account of the immediacy of linguistic understanding see Smith 2007b and 
2007c. 
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selectively illuminates a small number (perhaps one) of possibilities compatible with 
what our words say. It is not propositions — either minimally expressed or arrived at by 
enrichment — that we should be searching for in order to get at the truth of our 
utterances, so much as our selective take on the truth conditions of the sentences we utter. 
Room is always left for a distinction between all that is actually claimed by the uttered 
sentence, and what we typically take ourselves to be claiming in uttering it. Cognitive 
pragmatics and relevance theory can help at this point to explain our tendency to focus on 
only one understanding of what we actually say. Meanwhile, intelligible links can be 
maintained between the words people use to express themselves and what they intuitively 
understand themselves to be saying. This is the ordinary and intuitive notion of what is 
literally said. The more theoretical notion of what a sentence literally expresses is hard at 
first to recognize, and accessing it can be a considerable achievement.10 
 
 
7. Predicates of Taste and What We Express 
Does this way of thinking help us to address other linguistic phenomena?  I think it does, 
as we can see if we look at sentences involving predicates of taste.11 Assessments of the 
truth or falsity of such sentences often leads to intractable disputes with no clear way to 
resolve them. No further facts can be brought to light, and neither party to the dispute has 
overlooked anything. The intractability leads some to suppose that there is simple no fact 
of the matter concerning judgements of taste. However, we should not so easily surrender 
the idea that these sentences are truth-evaluable, especially when a skilled wine taster 
utters: 
 
(4) The wine is beautifully balanced 
 
                                                
10 This achievement is more readily available to high functioning autistic subjects, who 
for reasons of executive function disorder cannot so easily selectively attend to salient 
features of a situation, perhaps too many. However, they still use words with the same 
meanings we do. 
11 The semantic problems raised by predicates of personal taste are brought out well in 
Lasersohn 2006. The underlying philosophical issues are clearly addressed in Wright 
2006. A variant treatment of such disagreements can be found in Smith 2005. 
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Surely, such pronouncements aim to get something right, and if they succeed they do 
justice to the wine in question. But now suppose two experienced wine critics, 
contemplating a bottle of 2003 Chateau Pavie, disagree about the truth of (4). A is 
convinced the wine is beautifully balanced and B is equally convinced it isn’t. What are 
we to make of their disagreement? Can we (or they) settle for the view that there is a fact 
of the matter, forever likely to elude both of them? Such a view is surely implausible for 
matters concerning how something tastes. It would be hard to settle for the view that 
there is no fact of the matter. Balance in a wine is a substantial achievement which wine 
makers aim for and do not always achieve, or achieve in every vintage. Still, there will be 
those who doubt there can be objective disagreements on judgements involving taste, and 
will deny sentences like (4) an objective truth value. However, wine critics are doing 
more than just reporting their subjective experiences; they aim to describe properties the 
wine has, not just their subjective experience. So how should we understand an 
intractable dispute between the two experts over the truth of (4)? Do they simply disagree 
about the meaning of (4), in which case there is no dispute? Or, is there a sense in which 
they are both right and we have to embrace some form of relativism? None of the options 
are very palatable. Can we do better?  
 
According to critic A an utterance of (4) would be true, and according to critic B it would 
be false. Should we say it is true according to one, false according to the other? To make 
sense of this we need to make appeal to an extra parameter of evaluation: 
 
(5) The wine is beautifully balanced (from A’s perspective) 
(6) The wine is not beautifully balanced (from B’s perspective) 
 
Described in this way, A and B no longer seem to be in conflict since (5) and (6) are not 
incompatible. The difficulty is to understand the appeal to perspectives and what it means 
for a claim to be true relative to a perspective. To assess truth according to A or B invites 
a subjectivism we were trying to avoid. But in assessing (4) we are not assessing the truth 
of ‘The wine is beautifully balanced according to A’ or ‘The wine is beautifully balanced 
according to B’. Anyone can recognise the truth of these claims from any standpoint. No 
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relativism obtrudes here. And (4) says neither of these things. If it did there would be no 
genuine disagreement between A and B. It would be akin to assessing the truth of (3): 
‘It’s raining’ with respect to different places, and this provides no ground for a 
disagreement. 
 
Either A and B are in good positions to judge or they are not, and if they are, shouldn’t 
we say they are both right? If A is in good health, he has not just brushed his teeth, 
sucked a lemon, or eaten chocolate, for example — then he will be judging under ideal 
circumstances for him, and what he says by uttering (4) will be true. But the same goes 
for B. And how can the semantic content of (4) be true when said by one person and false 
when said by another? Instead of being absolute, the truth of (4) would be relative to an 
additional parameter, as in (3). So either (4) expresses a proposition that lacks a truth 
value, or, if one believes that propositions must be true or false, it fails to express a 
proposition, and needs some completion in context in order to do so.  
 
But the example calls for neither of these options. We can argue that the sentence 
expresses an explicit content with a truth condition but that there is more than one way to 
meet that condition and different tasters will focus on just one of the ways for the 
sentence to be true: one way for the wine to be balanced. Let me explain. 
 
Given A’s palate and his threshold sensitivities to alcohol, acid, sugar and tannin, ‘This 
wine is balanced’ is true. But given B’s palate, and very different threshold sensitivities 
to these elements, there is another, quite different – but unactualized – point at which the 
complex of the wine’s constituents would be in balance and would make it true for her 
that the wine was balanced.  Had the wine maker picked less ripe grapes and extracted 
rather less from the skins, there could have been a different ratio of elements on which B 
would have correctly judged (4) to be true. Each taster would be right because each of 
these conditions of the wine would constitute a different way of making sentence (4) true. 
In the circumstances in which B’s palate is involved, the second way of wine making 
would make the sentence true but not the first. In the circumstance in which A’s palate is 
involved it is the first way, not the second, that would make it true. According to which 
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taster or critic, we ask, we could get a different though correct answer to the question of 
whether a wine was balanced due to the different circumstances with respect to which 
this could be true. 
 
A will say under circumstance C1 that the wine is beautifully balanced. So for him 
sentence (4) will be true. B will demur, and according to her it is false. But there are other 
circumstances C2 under which the wine could have been balanced for her, lower alcohol, 
greater grip, less use of oak, less extraction, and according to her, in those circumstances, 
the sentence would have been true. Both A and B are right about their own verdicts, but 
wrong to criticize each other’s. The wine would be balanced in both conditions, but is 
only recognizable as balanced for A in circumstances C1 and only recognizable as 
balanced for B in circumstances C2.12  Is truth relative to the context of judgement, or 
from a perspective? No. But our take on truth is, very likely, relativized in just this way. 
 
The truth of (4) is not sensitive to aspects of the context of assessment. Its truth-value 
does not vary from one circumstance to another. Nor does (4) need to be contextually 
enriched to determine the proposition expressed by A or B. Instead (4) simply leaves 
things open as to how the world could be when (4) is true. There can be more than one 
point at which a wine could be balanced, and judged so by different tasters (or 
populations of tasters); the sentence simply doesn’t pick out any of them in particular. 
Different tasters will think of the conditions for (4)’s truth that they can access as the way 
for (4) to be true. They will selectively attend to just those conditions: the others being 
out of reach given their palates and sensitivities.  
 
When judging in different samples of the same wine, critics may disagree with each other 
on when it is true to say the wine is balanced. They may each be right in what they judge 
but wrong to discount the other’s judgement. (4) is not, as they think, false with respect to 
those other circumstances, or samples. Nor is it only true in their favoured conditions, it 
                                                
12 For a defence of the claim that there are objective properties of taste that tasters can fail 
to recognize subjectively, see Smith 2007(a).  
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is simply that each critic has no way of grasping the truth when confirmed by another 
critic with a different palate.  
 
Is the sentence or the condition it imposes somehow vague or indeterminate? No. We can 
all agree that for a wine to be balanced all its parts must be in harmony and no single 
taste must dominate the others. This is what we are saying, and agree that we are saying, 
whenever we say a wine is beautifully balanced. But what makes it true according to me, 
may not be what makes it true according to you.  Nevertheless, under these very different 
conditions we may both have a way of recognising the truth of the proposition expressed 
by sentence (4) — just as we do with (1). 
 
What conclusions are there for belief and action on this view of linguistic meaning? What 
should I conclude from someone’s saying that a given wine is beautifully balanced? The 
answer is that it depends on who said it. If it was someone in my population of tasters, it 
is true for me (as the relativists like to say). I assess the truth of what is said with respect 
to the sayer, and whether I buy a case of this wine depends on the reported sentence 
having been true according to a critic who judges as I do. Endorsing the truth of (4) is 
relative to who says it, and assessor relative to which sort of palate and sensibilities one 
has as a taster. But of course it is only the endorsement or taking something to be true 
that is assessor relative, not truth itself. There are other ways for the sentence to be true. 
But they are not the ways that count for me.   
 
8. Conclusion 
Language doesn’t do everything we think it does. It seldom achieves a precise 
encapsulation of our thoughts: though we may be blind to this fact as speakers and 
imagine we are expressing ourselves perfectly. Sometimes it does more than we think: 
unlike logic, there are surprises in language. We need to distinguish between how we 
apply a sentence – the conditions under which we assert or assess it– and the various 
ways the world could be that would make the sentence true. Failure to note these 
distinctions makes for quick though perhaps faulty argument about what is (or isn’t) 
expressed by a sentence, and what is required to engage in explicit communication; 
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conclusions of considerable significance for the semantics-pragmatics distinction. There 
may be more room for a truth-conditional semantics than cognitive pragmatics currently 
acknowledges, though pragmatics will still have the central role to play in explaining how 
we make selective use of what our linguistic capacities makes available.13  
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